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   In this essay, I shall take up the theme of Galileo’s notion of cause, which has already received considerable attention.​[2]​ I shall argue that the participants in the debate as it stands have overlooked a striking and essential feature of Galileo’s notion of cause. Galileo not only reformed natural philosophy, he also – as I shall defend – introduced a new notion of causality and integrated it in his scientific practice (hence, this new notion also has its methodological repercussions). Galileo’s conception of causality went hand in hand with his methodology (see section 3). This is the main message of this essay. It is my claim that Galileo was trying to construct a new scientifically useful notion of causality. This new notion of causality is an interventionist notion. According to such a notion, causal relations can be discovered by actively exploring and manipulating natural processes. In order to know nature we have to intervene in nature. Generally: If we wish to explore whether A is a cause of B, we will need to establish whether deliberate and purposive variations in A result in changes in B. If changes in A produce changes in B, the causal relation is established. It will be shown that this notion first emerged from Galileo’s work in hydrostatics and came to full fecundity in his treatment of the tides.
   Let me first of all take stock of the present discussion. De Motu is one of Galileo’s early scientific works on what we today would roughly call ‘mechanics’ (written between 1589 and 1592). That in De Motu Galileo wishes to establish a causal explanation of motion (and acceleration) is accepted by all scholars.​[3]​ According to Galileo, falling bodies are moved by an internal cause; projectiles by an external one.​[4]​ Galileo indeed claims that he wished to determine the hidden causes of observable effects “for what we seek are the causes of effects, and these causes are not given to us by experience)”.​[5]​ In dealing with the cause of acceleration, Galileo clarifies that he wants to discover the true, essential and not the accidental cause of acceleration.​[6]​ Acceleration is an accidental feature of motion, caused by the gradual overtaking of the intrinsic weight of a body during fall, after being lifted (and the weight being diminished) by an impressed force. Scholars begin to disagree however on the presence and importance of causal explanations in the period after this early work. Edwin A. Burtt, echoing Ernst Mach, wrote that Galileo’s studies on motion led him to focus more on the how than on the why of motion.​[7]​ Closely connected to this is Galileo’s ban of final causes from natural philosophy.​[8]​ Galileo, according to Burtt, treated motions as the secondary causes of natural phenomena and the forces producing them as their primary causes (of which the nature or essence is further unknown).​[9]​ We only know quantitative effects of forces in terms of motion.​[10]​ This implies that knowledge of primary, essential causes is impossible according to Galileo. After Burtt, authors have gone even further: they questioned the presence of causal explanation in toto in Galileo’s (mature) work. On the one side of the spectrum, Drake claims that Galileo banished causal inquiries from his science, since they were speculative and unnecessary:

The word cause, frequent in this early book, is less frequent in the later ones. It played little part in Galileo’s mature presentation of scientific material, which he confined more and more to observational and mathematical statements.​[11]​

Causal claims were present in his early work (e.g. in the discourse on floating bodies (1612)), but not in his mature work (by which Drake apparently means the Dialogo and the Discorsi).​[12]​ Pietro Redondi seems to side with Drake: Galileo was defending a docta ignorantia with respect to causes and causal knowledge.​[13]​ There are some passages which seem to converge to this interpretation (note that they can be made consistent with the causal interpretation as well). For instance, after having reviewed various hypothetical explanations of the cause of gravity, Salviati says:

Now, all these fantasies, and others too, ought to be examined; but it is not really worth while. At present it is the purpose of our Author merely to investigate and to demonstrate some of the properties of accelerated motion (whatever the cause of this acceleration may be) (…).​[14]​

Ernan V. McMullin, however, correctly argues that this passage in the Discorsi does not necessarily mean a rejection of causal explanation: It simply means that dynamics needs to be preceded by kinematics.​[15]​ Only when the properties of motion have been described, can we start with explaining them causally. This does not necessarily entail a rejection of causal explanation as such.
   On the other side, there are authors who stress the importance of causal explanation and causal reasoning in Galileo’s work and relate them to past traditions where causal knowledge was important. Peter K. Machamer argued that Galileo’s notion of cause is that of the tradition of the mixed sciences (“scientiae mixtae”): 

I shall attempt to show that though Galileo does use such causal language with serious intent, there is a sense in which Drake is right about Galileo’s unconcern for causes; Galileo is, for the most part but not all always, unconcerned about extrinsic, efficient causes. This is one aspect familiar to those who deal with the mixed sciences. Galileo is concerned very much with formal and final causes, and sometimes material causes.​[16]​

He admits that his analysis is primarily based on the Discorsi.​[17]​ According to Machamer, proper (causal) explanations refer to formal, final and material (necessitating) causes.​[18]​ William W. Wallace has connected Galileo’s notion of cause to the Aristotelian tradition.​[19]​ Galileo frequently uses causal parlance which is in agreement with Aristotle’s views of causes and his ideas on scientific method laid down in the Posterior Analytics. Galileo’s scientific demonstrations agree to and are derived from, as John H. Randall first argued, the regressus strategy in the Aristotelian tradition.​[20]​ Wallace’s main message is that Galileo’s nuove scienze were not created de novo. Jacopo Zabarella was, as Randall claimed, “the methodologist who stood behind Galileo’s early account of demonstrative methodology”.​[21]​ Galileo continued to use the regressus throughout his career with various modifications.​[22]​
   Causal explanations are certainly present in Galileo’s work.​[23]​ That is presently not the issue at stake: 

The problem of causality in his science is clearly not whether he sought causal explanations, but rather how he sought them and how he thought they could lead to certain and unrevisable  knowledge about the physical world.​[24]​

I would add to that list that in addition to this we also need to clarify what Galileo’s notion of cause was. In this essay, I shall not directly evaluate Wallace’s and Machamer’s readings. My point is rather different: instead of solely focussing on past traditions from which much of Galileo’s terminology appears to be derived, we should pay more attention to some of the innovative features of Galileo’s notion of causality. There are prima facie parallels with past traditions and indeed Galileo frequently used Aristotelian terminology. But, let us not equivocate Galileo’s notion of ‘cause’ with that of a past tradition too fast. Let us also look at possibly original contributions of Galileo to the idea of cause.​[25]​ This is the aim of the present essay: to point to the interventionist strand in Galileo’s conception of cause.
   In section 2 I shall therefore begin by carefully looking at some of Galileo’s causal reasoning strategies. I shall discuss Galileo’s treatment of the floating and sinking of bodies in water and his explanation of the tides. I have chosen these cases, because on these occasions Galileo is very explicit on his causal reasoning and his notion of ‘cause’. These cases will pave the way for a more elaborate understanding of Galileo’s notion of cause. In section 3, I shall compare Galileo’s interventionist notion of cause with James Woodward’s recent theory of causation, presently one of the most developed interventionist accounts of causation. In the final section (4), I shall briefly point to the significance of Galileo’s interventionist notion of cause in connection to the idea of what Antonio Pérez-Ramos has called an “active science”.​[26]​

2. Galileo and the Occurrence of Physical Causes in his Scientific Work

   In 2.1.1 and 2.2.1, we shall look at two case-studies in Galileo’s works (one stemming from the mid-period of his scientific career and one from his later work) where he explicitly discusses the notion of physical cause. These cases will give us access to Galileo’s notion of cause. This will set the stage for a fuller discussion of Galileo’s notion of physical cause in sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2. The goal of this section (2) is to penetrate the deeper conceptual strata of Galileo’s notion of ‘cause’. I attempt to characterize Galileo’s notion of “cause” in the form of three general statements, which are meta-level descriptions of Galileo’s notion of “cause”.

2.1. The Emergence of ‘Cause’ in the Discourse on Floating Bodies (1612)

2.1.1. Galileo’s Causal intuitions in the Discourse on Floating Bodies

   Galileo’s discourse on floating bodies (first edition: 1612) was a best-selling book in its own time. Unfortunately, it has received relatively little attention by scholars.​[27]​ It is certainly relevant for an understanding of Galileo’s notion of physical cause, since Galileo explicitly addresses the problem of finding true causes. Stillman Drake suggests that, when Galileo first sharply defined the word “cause” for use in scientific inquiries, the “process by which causes gave way to laws in science may be considered as having begun”.​[28]​ In this discourse Galileo refuted the Aristotelian explanation of floating. The Aristotelians, like Lodovico delle Colombe, asserted that bodies floated on water because of their flat shape which prevents its piercing the water’s resistance to division.​[29]​ Lodovico delle Colombe claimed to have refuted Galileo by the following experimentum crucis: a flat ebony chip floats, while an ebony ball of the same weight cannot do so.​[30]​ The central tenet of the Aristotelians was water’s resistance to division. This tenet was based rather on the metaphysical assumption that all motion requires an opposing medium, and not on experiments.​[31]​ Galileo claimed – in agreement with Archimedes – that “only greater or lesser heaviness in relation to water” is the cause of floating or sinking.​[32]​ Both parties claimed to have inferred the cause of floating bodies. How do we know what is the true cause? 
   Galileo, in defending his position, often argued about what a ‘(proper) cause’ precisely is. In his notes early in the hydrostatic discussion (and not in the discourse itself), Galileo wrote that “Causa è quella, la qual posta, sèguita l’effetto; e rimossa, si rimuove l’effetto” (“Cause is that which put [placed], the effect follows; and removed, the effect is removed.” (sic)).​[33]​ This definition seems to have guided him in his scientific research. Galileo set out to search for the “true, intrinsic, and entire cause of the rising and floating of some solid bodies in water”.​[34]​ He wrote:

With a different method and other means I shall seek to reach the same conclusion [as Archimedes], reducing the causes of such effects to principles more intrinsic and immediate, in which are perceived also the causes of some admirable and almost incredible events, as that a very small quantity of water may raise up and sustain with its small weight a solid body that is a hundred of thousand times heavier = the famous hydrostatical paradox. And since demonstrative advance requires it I shall define some terms and then explain some propositions from which, as from things true and noted, I may then serve my own purposes.​[35]​

The terms Galileo refers to are specific weight, i.e. the weight of a body in a given volume, absolute weight, i.e. the ‘normal’ weight of a body, and the moment. On “moment” Galileo writes:

Moment, among mechanics, means that force, that power, that efficacy, with which the mover moves and the moved resists, which force depends not simply on weight, but on speed of motion [and] on different inclinations of the spaces over which motion is made – for a heavy body descending makes greater impetus in a steeper space than in one less steep. And in short, whatever be the cause of such force, it always keeps this name of moment.​[36]​ 

The first proposition that follows from these concepts is that if two bodies on a balance have equal absolute weight, their moment will be equal. Hence, they make equilibrium.​[37]​ The second proposition is that the moment and the power of heaviness is increased by the speed of motion.​[38]​ Then Galileo started laying down further physico-mathematical theorems and experiments, which confirmed that the sinking or floating of bodies is dependent on their specific heaviness.​[39]​ These propositions indeed “opened the road to the contemplation of the true, intrinsic, and proper cause of the diverse motions and of rest of different solid bodies in various mediums”.​[40]​ Galileo claimed that bodies sink or float irrespective of their form.​[41]​ This can be shown by experiments where the (specific) weight is kept fixed and the form is varied:

Therefore, commencing to investigate with examination by exact experiment how true it is that shape does not at all affect the sinking or not sinking of the same solids, and having already demonstrated how a greater heaviness of the solid with respect to the heaviness of the medium is the cause of its ascending or descending, [then] whenever we want to make a test of what effect diversity of shape has on the latter, it will be necessary to make the experiment with materials in which variety of heaviness does not exist. For were we to make use of materials that could vary in specific weight from one to another, when we encountered variation in the fact of descent or ascent we would always remain with ambiguous reasoning as to whether the difference derived truly from shape alone, or also from different heaviness.​[42]​

Form is a cause secundum quid, it functions as an assisting or concomitant cause.​[43]​ It can influence the speed of descent or ascent, but it is not as such the cause of its upward and downward motion. It is a secondary cause, not a primary cause.​[44]​ The prima facie anomalous floating of the chip is then explained as follows. The chip, upon closer inspection, is immersed under the water level with a layer of air above it. This layer and the original chip form an aggregate which is specifically lighter than water. Hence its will (nearly) float. The form of the chip is not the true cause of its floating. The form does allow for the air to take its space above the chip, but it is the presence of the air that produces the lighter-than-water-aggregate. This lighter-than-water-aggregate is the true cause. Scientific understanding for Galileo was discovering the proximate and immediate causes of phenomena. True causes are the immediate causes not the mediate ones.​[45]​

2.1.2. A More Systematic Analysis of Galileo’s Causal Intuitions in the Discourse on Floating Bodies

   Let us take stock and characterize Galileo’s notion of cause in the discourse on floating bodies. We have seen that Galileo conceived of a true cause as the most proximate and immediate factor that brings an effect about. Without that factor the effect would not occur. Whether an effect is directly produced by a property can be established by varying this property, while keeping all other properties fixed. If the effect follows, the property under investigation is the true cause. If the effect does not follow, the property is not the true cause. A true cause needed to refer to some essential property of the object under investigation (of course, distinguishing between essential properties and accidental ones is sometimes a precarious work).​[46]​ In the discourse form is an accidental property, while specific weight is not. Based on this, we can see that one of the Galileo’s early strategies for causal reasoning is isolating and varying the presumed causal factor (IVC):

(IVC):
If, when keeping fixed all other relevant causal factors (Px), varying property P1 (= the assumed causal factor) results in an alteration of property E1 (= the effect), then we may conclude that P1 is a causal factor for E1 (or as Galileo would formulate it “a true cause”). 
 
In Bodies That Stay Atop Water or Move in It, Galileo typically assumes that a true cause is universal in the sense that is responsible for all observable floating or sinking behaviour. This is, what I would call, the universality and uniqueness assumption (U²) of Galileo’s notion of ‘cause’:

(U²general):
If P1 is a true cause of E1, then P1 is a universal and unique cause, i.e. it explains all E’s similar to E1 (under all circumstances).

(U²sinking or floating):
If P1 (specific weight) is a true cause of E1 (the sinking of lead or the floating of olive oil) then P1 is a universal and unique cause, i.e. it explains all E’s similar to E1 (the floating or sinking behaviour of all bodies under all circumstances).

In other words, two generalisations are made: (1) the causal relation as such and (2) the fact that the inferred cause is assumed to be a unique cause, i.e. that it explains all similar phenomena (or put differently, that similar phenomena cannot be caused by different causes). Post factum, we might of course say that Galileo’s universality assumption was incorrect, since it is not unimaginable to find similar effects which are produced by different causes. It is not possible to explain all phenomena of sinking and floating solely by specific weight. According to the modern explanation, the direct cause of the floating anomalous chip is the surface tension of the water. This is a case where one causal factor (surface tension) nullifies another causal factor (greater specific heaviness with respect to water). According to Galileo’s reasoning the lighter-than-water-aggregate of ebony and air is the direct cause of the floating of the chip. This explanation is introduced ad hoc, after Galileo’s statement that specific heaviness with respect to water is the true cause. Galileo’s true cause turned out not to be unique.

2.2. The Causal Explanation of the Tides in the Dialogo (1632)

2.2.1. The Causal Intuitions in the Explanation of the Tides

   Although Galileo’s theory of the tides has received relatively few attention​[47]​, the theory was to Galileo’s mind the “principal event” in the Dialogo.​[48]​ In the Fourth Day of the Dialogo (1632), Galileo presents his geo-kinetic theory of the tides. An early version of this theory was written in 1616: Discorso del flusso e reflusso del mare.​[49]​ I shall focus on the later version from the Dialogo. The tides were to Galileo’s mind a physical proof that the earth moved.​[50]​ Salviati (Galileo’s spokesman) stresses that in dealing with questions like these “a knowledge of the effects is what leads to an investigation and discovery of the causes”.​[51]​ Such an investigation may lead to the “true and primary”​[52]​, or “universal causes”​[53]​ of the effects we observe. Galileo acknowledges that not “all proper and sufficient causes” will be adduced. In renouncing other alleged explanations, which Galileo calls “occult qualities” or “idle imaginations”​[54]​ (e.g. various depths of the sea, attraction or heat produced by the Moon), Salviati formulates a positive criterion for a true cause (“vera causa”), namely artificial reproduction:

But I believe that you have not any stronger indication that the true cause of the tides is one of those incomprehensibles than the mere fact that among all things so far adduced as verae causae there is not one which we can duplicate for ourselves by means of appropriate artificial device. For neither by the light of the moon or sun, nor by temperate heat, nor by differences of depth can we ever make water contained in a motionless vessel run to and fro, or rise and fall in but a single place. But if, by simply setting the vessel in motion, I can represent for you without any artifice at all precisely those changes which are perceived in the waters of the sea, why should you reject this cause and take refuge in miracles?​[55]​

Galileo even claimed to have “a mechanical model” of the tides.​[56]​ Unfortunately, he did not further discuss it.​[57]​ Galileo then presented his kinematical model of the tides.​[58]​ He explicitly renounced an explanation involving attractions of the Moon like the one favoured by Kepler.​[59]​ The uniform annual motion​[60]​ of the Earth from west to east (depicted by circle BC) and the uniform diurnal motion of the Earth from west to east (depicted by circle DEFG), result in an uneven mixed motion in the different parts on the earth (see figure 1). 

Figure 1. The earth’s annual and diurnal motion.

At point D the absolute motion will be the swiftest, since both motions act in the same direction. At point F the contrary will occur. At points E and G the absolute motion remains equal to the simple annual motion. The cause of the tides is the acceleration and deceleration of different parts of the earth which results from its diurnal and annual rotation. Paolo Palmieri uses the expression “tide-generating acceleration”.​[61]​ Indeed, when we accelerate and decelerate a vessel with water contained in it, we observe that the water will run back and forth.​[62]​ Galileo notes that:

Now this is the most fundamental and effective cause of the tides, without which they would not take place. But the particular events observed at different times and places are many and varied; these must depend upon diverse concomitant causes, though all must have some connection​[63]​ with the fundamental cause. So our next business is to bring up and examine the different phenomena which may be the causes of such diverse effects.​[64]​

Next, Galileo discusses the concomitant or particular causes. The first of these concomitant causes is the tendency of water “by its own weight” to return to equilibrium and pass beyond it and to continue to do so until its impetus has diminished. The second is the length of the vessel: in shorter vessels the oscillations will be more frequent; in longer ones less frequent. The third is the depth of the vessel: in deep vessels oscillations will be more frequent than in less deeper ones. The fourth is that the oscillations produce two motions: a rising and falling at either extremity (= vertical displacement) and the horizontal running to and fro (= horizontal current). The fifth is the inequality of the acceleration and deceleration communicated to different parts at great distance from each other at the same moment. The effects of the fifth concomitant cause are so fine-grained that “it is impossible for us to duplicate its effects by any practical experiment”.​[65]​ These secondary causes are adduced to explain the six-hour periods in the Mediterranean (the primary cause would by itself give rise to a twelve-hour period). Galileo states that:

These causes, although they do not operate to move the waters (that action being from the primary cause alone, without which there would be no tides), are nevertheless the principal factors in limiting the duration of the reciprocations, and operate so powerfully that the primary cause must bow to them.​[66]​ 

Galileo strengthens his claim by pointing out that “from one uniform cause only one single uniform effect can follow” and that “effects, being contrary and irregular, you can never deduce from one uniform and constant cause”.​[67]​ Galileo used a principle of superposition to explain the interaction of the tide-generating acceleration and the oscillatory properties of the seabed. He did not have the mathematical tools to deal with this problem. According to Galileo “there is only one true and primary cause for one effect”.​[68]​ That Galileo’s kinematical model is highly connected with his ideas on physical causes, can be seen from the following fragment:

Thus I say if it is true that one effect can have only one basic cause, and if between the cause and the effect there is a fixed and constant connection, then whenever a fixed and constant alteration is seen in the effect, there must be a fixed and constant variation in the cause. Now since the alterations which take place in the tides at different times of the year and of the month have their fixed and constant periods, it must be that regular changes occur simultaneously in the primary cause of the tides. Next, the alterations in the tides at the said times consist of nothing more than changes in their size; that is in the rising and lowering of the water a greater or lesser amount, and its running with greater or lesser impetus. Hence it is necessary that whatever the primary cause of the tides is, it should increase or diminish its force at the specific times mentioned.​[69]​ 

Again we encounter Galileo’s universality assumption. Let us use this presentation of Galileo’s theory of the tides as starting point for an analysis of Galileo’s notion of physical cause.

2.2.2. A More Systematic Treatment of These Intuitions

   Being able to reproduce the observed effect by means of a mechanical model is one of Galileo’s criteria for establishing causal relations between events. In the case of the tides it is impossible to manipulate or control the kinematical properties of the earth. Therefore, Galileo uses what he thinks is a representative small-scale model which reproduces and isolates the kinematical properties of the earth. This model is similar qua kinematical properties to the earth. The model obviously does not take into account the form of the seabed. The motions of the model indeed result in to and fro motion. Hence, Galileo concludes that the tides are caused by a similar acceleration. I refer to this strategy as artificial reproduction (AR):

(AR):
If a representative physical model M, similar qua property P to a physical system φ, produces in virtue of P certain regular effects EM, then P is the primary cause of the similar and regular Eφ’s.

Galileo uses a replica or simulacrum, which easily allows manipulative operations, to model a physical system which is physically impossible to manipulate directly. In cases where human interventions are impossible, Galileo instead manipulates a representative replica in order to answer his scientific questions. William R. Shea correctly noted: 

It is one of Galileo’s great contributions to the development of the scientific method that he clearly recognised the necessity of isolating the true cause by creating artificial conditions where one element is varied at a time.​[70]​

Bear in mind that it was Galileo’s main point to show that the tides are produced by a mixed motion. Galileo’s strategy is strongly based on his principle that “there is only one true and primary cause for one effect”. Since Galileo accepts this principle as a true maxim he may easily infer that the cause of the effects of the model is identical to the cause of the effects of the physical system. Since they are the same effects, they are produced by the same cause (cf. Galileo’s U assumption). Despite Galileo’s insistence on finding universal causes, he had to take into account secondary causes to explain the tides. The observed effects are highly irregular. To explain these irregularities Galileo ad hoc adduces the secondary causes: the tendency of water to equilibrate itself, the depth of the sea, the breadth, … etc. These secondary causes disturb the regular effects. 

3. Contempory Interventionist Intuitions TC "3.3. Common Interventionist Intuitions" \f C \l "2" 

   In this section, I shall briefly compare Galileo’s intuitions on causation with one of the central contemporary interventionist accounts on causation in the philosophy of science. Contemporary philosophers of science have attempted to develop and elaborate an interventionist or manipulationist account of causation and explanation.​[71]​ I shall focus on James Woodward’s account. His account is meant as a theory of causal explanation. Such an account holds that causal and explanatory relations are “relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control” and that these relationships are “invariant under interventions”.​[72]​ It is my claim that Galileo had similar interventionist or manipulationist intuitions on causation. Let us first look at Woodward’s modern interventionist intuitions.​[73]​ It is not my aim here to present a complete survey of Woodward’s theory of causation, nor to evaluate Woodward’s proposal, but only to touch upon those matters that are relevant to a fruitful comparison with Galileo. To Woodward’s mind causes are “potential handles or devices for bringing about effects”.​[74]​ Judea Pearl labels causal networks as “oracles of intervention”.​[75]​ Of crucial importance are Woodward’s notions of intervention variable and invariance. If X and Y are two variables with different values, I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y, if and only if, the following criteria hold:

(IV)
I1. I causes X.
I2. I acts as a switch for all other variables that cause X. That is, certain values of I are such that when I attains those values, X ceases to depend on the values of other variables that cause X and instead depends only on the value taken by I.
I.3. Any directed path from I to Y goes through X. That is, I does not directly cause Y and is not a cause of any causes of Y that are distinct from X except, of course, for those causes of Y, if any, that are built into the I-X-Y connection itself; that is except for (a) any causes of Y that are effects of X (i.e., variables that are causally between X and Y) and (b) any causes of Y that are between I and Y and have no effect on Y independently of X.
I.4 I is (statistically) independent of any variable Z that causes Y and that is on a directed path that does not go through X.​[76]​

Some explanation is in order here.​[77]​ The intuitive idea is that I is an intervention variable for X with respect to Y, when all changes that occur in the value Y are produced only by changes in the value of X (which are directly brought about by I). I.1 states that the changes in X are produced by the intervention I. I.2 tells us that for some values of I, the value of X depends only on the value of I. In this way, we are able to rule out all other causes of X. I.3 informs us that I cannot directly cause Y and that I cannot be the cause of another variable (Z) that causes Y. Finally, I.4 says that there are no other variables, other than I, which produce Y. Woodward further distinguishes between direct causes and contributing causes: (1) X is a direct cause of X with respect to some variable set V, if there is a possible intervention of X that will change Y when all other variables in V besides X and Y are held fixed​[78]​; (2) X is a contributing cause of Y, if there is a directed path from X to Y such that each link in this path is a causal relationship.​[79]​ The relations we encounter in manipulating nature need to be stable.​[80]​ The second important notion, besides intervention, for Woodward’s account is invariance. Very crudely, this notion refers to the fact that the changes produced in Y through X continue to hold under a certain range of interventions. An invariant relation remains stable as other changes occur. Typically, we will generalize the result produced by our intervention. Invariance has to do with the fact that “the generalization should continue to hold under an intervention that changes its independent variables sufficiently (or in such a way) that the value of its dependent variable is predicted by the generalization to change under the intervention”.​[81]​ 
   Obviously, it is not my claim that Galileo endorsed exactly the same ideas on causation as Woodward. Galileo’s notion of causation clearly did not incorporate such notions as “(in)dependent variable”, “statistical probability”, or “invariance under manipulation”. And that is only for starters. I shall not go into detail and discuss all the differences here, since my claim focuses on the similarities. What is important is the following. Galileo endorsed the same intuition on which Woodward’s programme is based: that in order to establish causal relations we need, while keeping all other possible factors fixed, to manipulate and vary the presumed cause, whose manipulation and variation will result, if it is a real cause, in a variation of the effect (a variation in the cause will result in a variation of the effect). In order to control the effect, we should manipulate its cause. This interventionist stratum of causation in Galileo’s natural philosophy has not received much scholarly interest. This intuition, which is explicitly developed by Woodward (see his definition of direct cause), is embedded in Galileo’s scientific practice (see section 3.2). It played a highly significant role in Galileo’s practice of science. This should be clear by now from the discussion in section 3.2. It is one of Galileo’s strategies for inferring causal relations (IVC). In The Assayer (1623) Galileo explicitly discusses discovering causal links by intervention: 

To discover the true cause I reason as follows: “If we do not achieve an effect which others achieved, then it must be that in our operations we lack something that produces their success [“nostro operare manchiamo di quello che fu causa della riuscita d'esso effetto”]. And if there is just one single thing we lack, then that alone can be the true cause. (…)”​[82]​

Woodward’s idea of direct​[83]​/contributing cause roughly corresponds to Galileo’s idea of proximate/remote cause.
   A further important difference between Galileo and Woodward is that Galileo does not only have an interventionist concept of causation, but that he also has a direct interventionist methodology. Let me clarify what I mean by that. In his insistence on using a scale-model of the kinetic properties of the earth, Galileo seems to suggest that proper scientific knowledge presupposes actually realizable interventions. By contrast, Woodward allows that we may meaningfully make use of counterfactual claims about what would happen under interventions, even when such interventions are not physically possible.​[84]​ Hence, it makes sense to claim doubling the moon’s orbit would cause changes in the motion of the tides. Although we cannot change the moon’s orbit, Newton’s theory shows what would happen to the tides under an intervention that doubles the moon’s orbit, and “this is enough for counterfactual claims about what would happen under such interventions to be legitimate and to allow us to assess their truth”.​[85]​ 

4. In Conclusion: Galileo as an “Operative Scientist”

   In the seventeenth century scientific practice was increasingly portrayed as a practice wherein we manipulate and reproduce natural phenomena. In the literature on the emergence of the idea of science as an operative science (“scientia operativa”), Francis Bacon is usually given credit for this transformation.​[86]​ A knower, according to Bacon, is essentially a maker. True knowledge refers to knowledge which is made or can be made (reproduced, modelled, fabricated, …).​[87]​ In order to know a phenomenon we should be able to (re)produce it.​[88]​ Put more precisely: “The capacity of (re)producing Nature’s ‘effects’ was perceived as the epistemological guarantee of man’s knowledge of natural processes in the external world.”​[89]​. Accordingly, Bacon reacted to the Aristotelian dichotomy between products of nature (“naturalia”) and human arts (“artificialia”), by showing that there is no ontological difference between the spontaneous workings of nature and the workings which are directed or manipulated by man’s purposive action.​[90]​ Nature always maintains the same modus operandi. In his third Letter on the Sunspots (1613) Galileo subscribed to this idea:

Nature, deaf to our entreaties, will not alter or change the course of her effects; and those things that we are here trying to investigate have not just occurred once and then vanished, but have always proceeded and will always proceed in the same style.​[91]​

Hence, there is no fundamental difference between what nature produces herself and what is brought about by men.
   I have argued that there is a significant interventionist component in Galileo’s causal reasoning and practice. This component played an essential role in Galileo’s scientific practice and his articulation of the notion of ‘cause’, as can be seen from the examples discussed above. Galileo subscribed to the idea that if we wish to really understand nature we have to manipulate and reproduce her. “Nostro operare” is what provides us with a causal understanding of the world. Galileo was indeed a highly self-conscious operative scientist. 
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